[DHI] D.R. Horton: Q4 2026 Earnings Test Gross Margin as Incentives Stay High

D.R. Horton is the largest US homebuilder by homes closed, building and selling homes in 126 markets across 36 states, and it owns 62% of the residential lot developer Forestar[1]. Ahead of D.R. Horton's Q4 2026 earnings, the Drillr earnings calendar shows results scheduled for 2026-10-29[2]. Fourth quarter fiscal 2026 (three months ended September 30, 2026) is the period the company will report. In the latest disclosed quarter, the third quarter of fiscal 2026, consolidated revenue was $9.2 billion, consolidated pre-tax income was $1.2 billion, the pre-tax margin was 13.3% and diluted earnings per share were $3.20; homes closed rose 4% to 23,983, net sales orders of 23,084 homes were flat with the prior-year quarter, and the cancellation rate rose to 20% from 17%[3]. Home sales gross margin in the same quarter was 20.7%, 110 basis points below the prior-year quarter, and the average closing price fell 2% to $362,000[4]. On July 21 management guided fourth-quarter consolidated revenue of $8.8 billion to $9.3 billion, 22,500 to 23,000 homes closed, a home sales gross margin of 20.5% to 21% and a consolidated pre-tax margin of 12.3% to 12.8%[5]. Full-year guidance calls for consolidated revenue of $32.5 billion to $33.0 billion, 83,800 to 84,300 homes closed and at least $3.0 billion of operating cash flow[3], and on September 15 the company raised its full-year buyback expectation to at least $3.25 billion[6]. Analyst estimates compiled by Drillr on 2026-10-23 put fourth-quarter EPS at $3.01 and revenue at $9.07 billion; the data do not state how many analysts contributed[7].

Three things matter most in this report. The first is whether home sales gross margin lands inside the 20.5%-21% guide: the company says sales incentives will stay elevated into fiscal 2027[4], lot costs are still inflating about 5% year over year[5], and the low end of the guide is only 20 basis points below the third quarter's 20.7%, so a modest step-up in incentives could push the margin out of range. The second is whether orders and closings hold: management said demand softened late in the third quarter and cancellations rose to 20%[5], and whether the company closes 22,500-23,000 homes and keeps net orders at or above the prior-year quarter's 20,078[8][4] sets the closing base for the start of fiscal 2027. The third is whether cash can fund the capital return: operating cash flow was only $880.8 million in the first nine months[4], so meeting the full-year guide of at least $3.0 billion requires about $2.12 billion in the fourth quarter, while the company also needs to repurchase roughly $1.05 billion or more to reach its full-year target of at least $3.25 billion[6]; that depends on how much of the 38,000 homes in inventory at the end of June it can release[3].

Company Background and Business Structure

D.R. Horton is a national homebuilder whose main customers are first-time buyers. Over its 47-year history the company has closed more than 1.2 million homes, it has been the largest-volume US homebuilder every year since 2002, and it is one of the largest builders in most of its markets[1]. Its products span entry-level, move-up, active-adult and luxury homes, but the center of gravity is first-time buyers: in the third quarter 65% of mortgage closings went to first-time buyers, and the average closing price was about $155,000 below the US national average new home price[5]. That positioning makes demand unusually sensitive to mortgage rates and to buyers' ability to qualify for a loan.

Homebuilding is the core business and is reported in six regional segments: East, Southeast, South Central, Southwest, Northwest and North. In fiscal 2025, ended September 30, 2025, the company closed 84,863 homes, generated $31.4 billion of home sales revenue and earned $4.1 billion of homebuilding pre-tax income[8]. The company first controls land through purchase contracts and then prefers to buy finished lots developed by Forestar or third parties; 65% of fiscal 2025 closings were on such lots, up from 63% the year before[8], and at June 30, 2026, lots controlled through purchase contracts made up 78% of lots owned and controlled[4].

Sales contracts and revenue recognition shape both cancellation risk and the timing of cash. The company starts many homes speculatively, collects a deposit at signing, and its contracts include a financing contingency that lets buyers cancel and recover their deposit if they cannot obtain a mortgage within a defined period[1]. Revenue is recognized at closing, and incentives such as price discounts and mortgage rate buydowns directly reduce the net selling price; the company attributed the fiscal 2025 margin decline to higher incentives of this kind[8]. Because costs consist of land, construction and capitalized interest, heavier incentives and rising lot costs squeeze gross margin at the same time.

The other three businesses are smaller but closely tied to homebuilding. The financial services business, DHI Mortgage, originated or brokered 68,982 mortgage loans in fiscal 2025[1] and earned $278.7 million of pre-tax income; the rental business develops and sells single-family and multi-family rental properties and earned $170.0 million of pre-tax income in fiscal 2025[8], and rental property inventory stood at $3.1 billion at the end of June 2026, including $2.7 billion of multi-family[4]. Forestar is a publicly traded lot developer 62% owned by the company; it sold 14,240 lots in fiscal 2025, 83% of them to D.R. Horton[1], and earned $219.3 million of pre-tax income[8].

Financial History and Current Position

Fiscal 2025 was a year of slowing demand and shrinking profit. Homes closed fell 5% to 84,863, the average closing price fell 2% to $370,400, home sales revenue fell from $33.9 billion to $31.4 billion, and home sales gross margin dropped from 23.5% to 21.5%[8]. Net sales orders fell 4% to 83,423 homes worth $30.8 billion, year-end backlog was 10,785 homes worth $4.1 billion, and pre-tax income from homebuilding, rental, financial services and Forestar was $4.1 billion, $170.0 million, $278.7 million and $219.3 million respectively, all below fiscal 2024[8].

Cash flow in fiscal 2025 was nonetheless stronger than the year before, and capital returns were large. Operating cash flow was $3.4 billion, up from $2.2 billion in fiscal 2024; the company spent $4.3 billion on buybacks, paid $494.8 million of dividends and repaid $1.0 billion of homebuilding senior notes, ending the year with a debt-to-total-capital ratio of 19.8% against a long-term target of around 20%[9]. Of the homes in inventory at September 30, 2025, about 19,600 were unsold, including about 9,300 completed homes and about 800 that had been complete for more than six months[9].

Gross margin kept falling in the first two quarters of fiscal 2026. In the first quarter, ended December 31, 2025, home sales revenue was $6.5 billion on 17,818 homes closed[10], home sales gross margin was 20.4% versus 22.7% a year earlier, and net sales orders rose 3% to 18,300 homes[11]. In the second quarter, ended March 31, 2026, consolidated revenue was $7.6 billion, pre-tax income was $867.4 million for an 11.5% pre-tax margin, net income attributable to D.R. Horton fell 20% to $647.9 million, and net sales orders rose 11% to 24,992 homes[12]; home sales gross margin was 20.1% versus 21.8% a year earlier[13], including a 40 basis point one-time benefit from a favorable litigation outcome and lower warranty costs[12].

Margins recovered in the third quarter, ended June 30, 2026, but the sales pace slowed. Consolidated revenue was $9.2 billion, pre-tax income was $1.2 billion for a 13.3% pre-tax margin, and diluted EPS was $3.20; homebuilding revenue rose 1% to $8.7 billion, yet homebuilding pre-tax income fell 10% to $1.1 billion[3]. Home sales gross margin was 20.7%, down 110 basis points year over year, homebuilding SG&A rose to 8.3% of homebuilding revenue from 7.8%, and the nine-month gross margin was 20.4%, 170 basis points below the prior-year period[4].

Cash flow and the balance sheet were both tighter in the first nine months than a year earlier. Operating cash flow was $880.8 million versus $949.1 million in the prior-year period, with homebuilding providing $1.3 billion while rental and financial services used $324.6 million and $221.7 million respectively[4]. The company repurchased 14.6 million shares for $2.2 billion in the nine months, and shares outstanding at the end of June were 280.7 million, down 6% from a year earlier[3]; debt to total capital was 23.0% at June 30, up from 19.8% at the end of September 2025[4].

Operating Model

Home sales revenue depends on homes closed and the average closing price net of incentives. Consolidated revenue combines home sales, rental property sales, financial services and Forestar's lot sales to outside builders, with home sales by far the largest piece; closings come from backlog at the start of the quarter plus spec homes sold within the quarter, and net orders equal gross orders minus cancellations. Backlog at the end of the third quarter was 15,983 homes worth $6.2 billion, up 14% year over year[4]; those orders convert to revenue over the following one to two quarters, while a higher cancellation rate cuts closable homes along the same chain.

Pre-tax income is driven mainly by home sales gross margin and expense leverage. Pre-tax income roughly equals home sales revenue times home sales gross margin, minus homebuilding SG&A, plus pre-tax income from rental, financial services and Forestar; home sales gross margin is the gap between the net selling price and per-home land, construction, capitalized interest and warranty costs. The third quarter's 110 basis point year-over-year decline consisted of a 110 basis point hit from higher average home costs combined with a lower average selling price, a further 10 basis points from higher amortization of capitalized interest, and a 10 basis point offset from lower warranty and construction defect costs[4]. On roughly $8.7 billion of quarterly homebuilding revenue, each percentage point of gross margin is worth about $87 million of quarterly gross profit, and when community count grows while revenue does not, the SG&A ratio rises.

Operating cash flow is highly uneven across quarters and is concentrated in the fiscal fourth quarter. Operating cash flow roughly equals net income minus increases in homes under construction and completed, owned land and rental properties, plus or minus the change in mortgage loans held for sale; the company adds starts in the first half to prepare for the spring selling season, inflating inventory, and then cuts starts and releases inventory in the fourth-quarter closing peak. Fiscal 2025 operating cash flow was $3.4 billion[9] against only $949.1 million in the first nine months[4], implying about $2.45 billion in the fourth quarter; that cash then funds buybacks and dividends, and the company aims to keep debt to total capital around 20% over the long term[9].

The main limit of this model is that incentive costs are not disclosed separately. Total incentives and the cost of mortgage rate buydowns can only be inferred from the gross margin bridge and the average closing price, and the annual report does not break out fourth-quarter fiscal 2025 gross margin, closings or cancellation rate; only net orders and operating cash flow can be derived exactly by subtracting the nine-month figures from the full year.

Industry and Competitive Position

D.R. Horton's competitive advantage comes mainly from scale. It is the largest US homebuilder by homes closed and one of the largest builders in most of its markets[1]; that scale shows up in its cost of capital, national purchasing discounts on materials and subcontractor labor rates, and in long-standing relationships with Forestar and third-party land developers, with 83% of the lots Forestar sold in fiscal 2025 going to D.R. Horton[1].

The company's competitors are not limited to other new-home builders. D.R. Horton competes with national and regional homebuilders and with the resale market, and new-home demand depends on mortgage rates, employment and consumer confidence; in fiscal 2025 the value of net sales orders fell 6% and homebuilding revenue fell 7%, which the annual report attributed to affordability constraints and cautious consumer sentiment[8].

The focus on first-time buyers is both a strength and a weakness. The company competes for first-time buyers with lower price points and a supply of move-in-ready homes, and its third-quarter average closing price was about $155,000 below the US national average new home price[5]. Compared with builders that serve mainly move-up buyers who rely on selling an existing home, D.R. Horton is more sensitive to mortgage qualification and monthly-payment affordability, and buyers failing to qualify for a mortgage was the top cause of third-quarter cancellations[5].

The available peer comparison has clear limits. Peers' gross margins, orders and incentive levels lack comparable data on the same basis, so how far D.R. Horton's scale advantage translates into a margin advantage still needs to be tested by future disclosures.

Core Debates

With incentives set to stay elevated into fiscal 2027, can D.R. Horton hold its fourth-quarter home sales gross margin within 20.5%-21%?

Home sales gross margin is the main source of change in D.R. Horton's profit, and this debate sets the earnings base for the fourth quarter and the start of fiscal 2027. Home sales contribute more than 90% of revenue and most of the profit, and gross margin fell from 23.5% in fiscal 2024 to 21.5% in fiscal 2025[8] and then to 20.4% in the first nine months of fiscal 2026[4]. On roughly $8.7 billion of third-quarter homebuilding revenue, each percentage point of gross margin changes quarterly gross profit by about $87 million.

Part of the third quarter's rebound to 20.7% is a genuine improvement. The second quarter's 20.1% included a 40 basis point one-time benefit from litigation and warranty items[12], leaving about 19.7% underlying; the third quarter was 110 basis points below the prior year, and the 10-Q attributed the decline to higher per-home costs combined with a lower average selling price[4]. Management said fourth-quarter gross margin should be roughly flat sequentially, guided to 20.5%-21%, and said it is willing to accept lower sales volume to protect margin, while lot costs are still inflating about 5% year over year[5].

The margin transmission chain starts with first-time buyers' monthly-payment capacity. High mortgage rates squeeze first-time buyers' affordability, the company sustains sales with rate buydowns, price discounts and smaller floor plans, and the average closing price fell 2% to $362,000[4], while lot cost inflation of about 5% raises per-home cost[5]; together these push down gross margin and homebuilding pre-tax income. What remains unresolved is whether incentives stabilize: the company says incentives will stay elevated into fiscal 2027[4], while an alternative reading holds that, with orders slowing late in the third quarter and cancellations up to 20%, the fourth quarter may need more incentives to close homes, and the 20.5% floor of the guide is only 20 basis points below the third quarter.

Three data points in this report will test the debate. The first is whether fourth-quarter home sales gross margin falls within 20.5%-21% and whether the price-and-cost drag in the margin bridge narrows from the third quarter's 110 basis points; the second is whether the average closing price holds above roughly $355,000 and whether management describes a further step-up in incentives; the third is whether first-quarter fiscal 2027 gross margin guidance stays at or above 20.5%. If fourth-quarter gross margin falls below 20.5% and the company blames incentives or a lower average price, the trade-off of protecting margin at the expense of volume has not held; even if margin lands inside the guide, reliance on one-time warranty or litigation items would mean the operating squeeze has not eased.

After orders softened late in the third quarter and cancellations rose to 20%, can D.R. Horton close 22,500-23,000 homes in the fourth quarter without orders falling year over year?

The pace of orders and closings determines D.R. Horton's revenue scale and expense leverage. Homes closed times the average closing price equals home sales revenue, and orders determine how many homes can close in the next quarter; in the second quarter the full-year closings guide was still 86,000-87,500 homes[12], and in the third quarter it was cut to 83,800-84,300 because sales came in below internal expectations[3][5]. Community count grew 9% year over year[5] while homebuilding revenue grew only 1%, lifting the SG&A ratio from 7.8% to 8.3%[4]; unless volume recovers, the expense ratio will be hard to bring down.

Third-quarter figures support the view that the fourth-quarter closings guide is achievable. The company closed 23,983 homes in the quarter, and net sales orders of 23,084 homes worth $8.4 billion were flat with the prior-year quarter[3]; backlog at the end of June was 15,983 homes worth $6.2 billion, up 14% year over year[4]. But management also said demand softened late in the quarter, cancellations rose from 17% to 20% with mortgage qualification as the top cause, and fourth-quarter starts will be lower than in the third quarter[5].

Weaker demand would flow from orders all the way down to pre-tax income. High rates and weak consumer confidence reduce buyers' willingness to sign, failed mortgage qualification pushes up cancellations, net orders flatten or fall and backlog conversion slows, which ultimately shows up as fewer closings and lower home sales revenue, while the costs of a larger community footprint do not fall in step and further compress pre-tax income. What remains unresolved is the quality of the backlog: an alternative reading holds that part of the backlog growth came from orders pulled into the first half, when second-quarter net orders rose 11%[12], so fourth-quarter orders could fall below the prior-year quarter's 20,078 homes, a base derived by subtracting the prior-year nine-month total of 63,345 from fiscal 2025's full-year 83,423[8][4].

This report will test the debate at three levels: closings, orders and guidance. Investors will look at whether fourth-quarter closings fall within 22,500-23,000 homes and consolidated revenue within $8.8 billion to $9.3 billion[5], whether net orders are at least 20,078 homes and the cancellation rate drops back below 20%, and whether fiscal 2027 closings and revenue guidance and the SG&A ratio begin to improve. If fourth-quarter closings come in below 22,500 homes or net orders fall more than 5% year over year, the demand deterioration is not seasonal; a cancellation rate above 22% would mean backlog is not converting to revenue on schedule.

With only $881 million of operating cash flow in the first nine months, can D.R. Horton release enough inventory in the fourth quarter to deliver at least $3 billion of operating cash flow and at least $3.25 billion of buybacks?

Cash collection determines whether D.R. Horton can meet its buyback commitment without adding leverage. The company's operating cash flow is heavily concentrated in the fourth-quarter closing peak: fiscal 2025's full-year total was $3.4 billion[9] against only $949.1 million in the first nine months, and this year's nine-month figure was even lower at $880.8 million[4], so the full-year guide of at least $3.0 billion[3] requires about $2.12 billion in the fourth quarter. On September 15 the company raised its full-year buyback expectation from about $2.5 billion to at least $3.25 billion[6]; after the $2.2 billion repurchased in the first nine months[3], the fourth quarter needs roughly $1.05 billion or more.

Inventory and land data show the company has cash it can release. At June 30 it had 38,000 homes in inventory, including 23,300 unsold and 7,600 completed unsold homes[3]; a year earlier, homes in inventory fell from 36,900 at the end of March 2025 to 29,600 at the end of September[13], generating heavy second-half cash. Owned lots fell from 147,000 at the end of September 2025 to 126,600, the share of lots controlled through purchase contracts rose to 78%[4], and the company said fourth-quarter starts will be lower than in the third quarter[5].

At the other end of the cash chain sit rental investment and leverage. The transmission runs from lower fourth-quarter starts to converting inventory into closings and cash, with operating cash flow then funding at least $3.25 billion of full-year buybacks and about $500 million of dividends[3]; on the negative side, the rental business used $324.6 million of cash in the first nine months, rental property inventory rose to $3.1 billion at the end of June, and debt to total capital was 23.0%[4], above the long-term target of around 20%[9]. An alternative reading is that raising the buyback target signals management confidence in fourth-quarter cash collection, but if weaker demand leaves spec homes unsold, buybacks would have to be funded from cash balances or borrowing.

This report will test the debate through three sets of figures: cash, inventory and leverage. Investors will look at whether full-year operating cash flow reaches at least $3.0 billion and how much homebuilding and rental each contribute; whether homes in inventory and completed unsold homes at September 30 are clearly below June's 38,000 and 7,600; and whether full-year buybacks reach $3.25 billion, whether debt to total capital returns to around 20%, and what cash flow and buyback guidance the company gives for fiscal 2027. If full-year operating cash flow comes in below $3.0 billion, or homes in inventory remain above 34,000 at September 30, inventory release was insufficient; if buybacks are completed but debt to total capital is above 25%, capital returns were funded by borrowing rather than cash flow.

Risks and Falsifiers

Per-home cost pressure is the first risk to gross margin. Management said lot costs are still inflating about 5% year over year in the fourth quarter[5], and the third quarter's 110 basis point year-over-year margin decline came from exactly that combination of rising costs and a lower average price[4]; on about $8.7 billion of quarterly homebuilding revenue, each percentage point is worth roughly $87 million of gross profit. If the fiscal 2026 annual report's gross margin bridge shows the year-over-year price-and-cost drag narrowing to within 100 basis points, this concern would ease.

The rental business is tying up more capital while contributing less revenue. Rental property inventory was $3.1 billion at the end of June, including $2.7 billion of multi-family, nine-month rental revenue fell from $835.0 million to $587.4 million, and the rental segment used $324.6 million of operating cash[4]. Rental property investment directly reduces consolidated operating cash flow, and when sales slow the capital stays on the balance sheet; if fourth-quarter rental property sales increase and rental property inventory at September 30 falls below June's $3.1 billion, this risk would be falsified.

Higher mortgage rates would hit demand and price at the same time. If first-time buyers' monthly-payment capacity falls further, the company would need more rate buydowns and price discounts to complete fourth-quarter closings, while lot cost inflation of about 5% keeps lifting per-home cost[5]; each percentage point of lower gross margin cuts quarterly gross profit by about $87 million, and a margin below the 20.5% floor of the guide would trigger this risk. Only a fourth-quarter margin of at least 20.5%, a narrower price-and-cost drag in the margin bridge and first-quarter fiscal 2027 guidance of at least 20.5%, all together, would falsify it.

Rising cancellations could keep backlog from converting on schedule. If tighter mortgage qualification and weak consumer confidence keep pushing cancellations up, fourth-quarter closings would fall short of guidance and weaken the closing base for early fiscal 2027[5]; at the third-quarter average price of $362,000, every 500 fewer closings removes about $180 million of revenue[4], while costs from 9% community count growth would not fall in step and the SG&A ratio would keep rising. Fourth-quarter closings of at least 22,500 homes, a cancellation rate back below 20% and net orders of at least 20,078 homes would falsify this risk.

Weak cash collection would make buybacks depend on borrowing. If softer demand slows the sale of spec homes, fourth-quarter inventory release would fall short of the prior year, while the raised buyback target requires roughly $1.05 billion or more of cash[6]; every $500 million that full-year operating cash flow falls short of the $3.0 billion guide would have to be covered by cash balances or borrowing to complete the buybacks, and debt to total capital was already 23.0% at the end of June[4]. Full-year operating cash flow of at least $3.0 billion and debt to total capital back below 22% at September 30 would falsify this risk.

What to Watch Next

• Gross margin under incentives: fourth-quarter home sales gross margin against a third-quarter baseline of 20.7% (21.8% a year earlier)[4]. Watch whether it lands within the 20.5%-21% guide and whether the price-and-cost drag narrows; a result below 20.5% blamed on incentives or price would mean the margin-first trade-off failed.
• Gross margin under incentives: the average closing price, $362,000 in the third quarter and down 2% year over year. Watch whether it holds above about $355,000; a further decline alongside heavier incentive language would mean the squeeze has not eased.
• Orders and closings: fourth-quarter closings and consolidated revenue against a third-quarter base of 23,983 homes and $9.2 billion[3]. Watch for 22,500-23,000 homes and $8.8 billion to $9.3 billion; closings below 22,500 would point to non-seasonal demand weakness.
• Orders and closings: net orders against the prior-year fourth quarter's 20,078 homes and a third-quarter cancellation rate of 20%. Watch for orders of at least 20,078 and cancellations back below 20%; orders down more than 5% year over year or cancellations above 22% would falsify the current view.
• Cash and buybacks: full-year operating cash flow against $880.8 million in the first nine months. Watch for at least $3.0 billion; anything lower would mean insufficient inventory release.
• Cash and buybacks: homes in inventory, buybacks and leverage against 38,000 homes, 23.0% debt to total capital and $2.2 billion of buybacks through June. Watch for a clear drop in inventory and full-year buybacks of at least $3.25 billion; inventory still above 34,000, or completed buybacks with debt to total capital above 25%, would weaken the current view.

Conclusion

D.R. Horton's results depend on three variables that pull against each other: homes closed, the gap between the incentive-adjusted average price and per-home cost, and how much inventory cash the fourth quarter can release. Home sales gross margin had already fallen to 21.5% in fiscal 2025[8], it was 20.7% in the third quarter of fiscal 2026, nine-month operating cash flow was $880.8 million and debt to total capital was 23.0% at the end of June[4], while the full-year buyback target has been raised to at least $3.25 billion[6]. The central unresolved relationship is that the company has chosen to protect margin at the expense of volume, yet its buyback commitment needs heavy fourth-quarter closings to bring cash back in, and this report will show whether both can hold at once.

Since the third-quarter results, no outside assessment with an independent argument and readable full text could be found; available coverage consists mainly of share-price moves, institutional holding changes, local development approvals and brokers adjusting their views on the stock, so no outside interpretation is cited here and that material is not treated as a market view. That leaves the three debates to be checked only against the company's own account: management stresses sequentially flat fourth-quarter gross margin and lower starts[5], but those judgments have not yet been tested by independent third-party analysis.

The combination that would materially strengthen the current understanding is a fourth-quarter gross margin of at least 20.5% with a narrower bridge drag, closings within 22,500-23,000 homes and net orders of at least 20,078, and full-year operating cash flow of $3.0 billion that brings debt to total capital back to about 20% after the buybacks are completed. Conversely, a margin below the floor of the guide, cancellations above 22% or buybacks funded mainly by borrowing would show that weak demand is eroding both profitability and the capacity to return capital.

Sources

[1] DHI FY2025 10-K filed 2025-11-19 · business and scale · 2025-11-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000882184&type=10-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[2] DHI earnings calendar updated 2026-10-23 · 2026-10-23 · Drillr earnings calendar

[3] DHI Q3 FY2026 8-K filed 2026-07-21 · 2026-07-21 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000882184&type=8-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[4] DHI Q3 FY2026 10-Q filed 2026-07-23 · 2026-07-23 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000882184&type=10-Q&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[5] DHI Q3 FY2026 earnings call 2026-07-21 · 2026-07-21 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[6] DHI 8-K filed 2026-09-15 · repurchase authorization · 2026-09-15 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000882184&type=8-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[7] Drillr analyst estimates DHI Q4 FY2026 retrieved 2026-10-23 · 2026-10-23 · Drillr analyst estimates · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[8] DHI FY2025 10-K filed 2025-11-19 · fiscal 2025 results · 2025-11-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000882184&type=10-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[9] DHI FY2025 10-K filed 2025-11-19 · cash flow and capital · 2025-11-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000882184&type=10-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[10] DHI Q1 FY2026 earnings call 2026-01-20 · 2026-01-20 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[11] DHI Q1 FY2026 10-Q filed 2026-01-22 · 2026-01-22 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000882184&type=10-Q&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[12] DHI Q2 FY2026 8-K filed 2026-04-21 · 2026-04-21 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000882184&type=8-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[13] DHI Q2 FY2026 10-Q filed 2026-04-23 · 2026-04-23 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000882184&type=10-Q&dateb=&owner=include&count=40